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CHOICE OF REMUNERATION REGIME IN FISHERIES: 
THE CASE OF HAWAII’S LONGLINE FISHERIES 
  
ABSTRACT 
One of the most prominent features of remuneration in the Hawaii’s longline 
fisheries industry has been the norm of share contract regimes.  This paper investigates 
whether the use of share contract regime is positively correlated to increased economic 
returns.  The principal-agent framework is applied to develop a theoretical model for the 
remuneration choice.  Empirical estimation is conducted using a switching regression 
model that accounts for certain vessel characteristics effects on revenue, depending on 
remuneration regime used (i.e., share contract or flat wage), as well as the potential 
selection bias in the vessels’ contractual choice. Key findings from counterfactual 
simulations indicate: (1) a negative selection into choosing share contracts, and (2) that 
flat wage vessels would experience significantly higher revenues if they switch to share 
contracts.  Thus, even though the labor market in Hawaii’s longline fisheries relies upon 
foreign crew members, the results suggest that it would benefit owners of flat wage 
vessels to apply share contracts to increase their revenues. 
 
Keywords: Remuneration Regime; Longline Fisheries; Hawaii; Commercial Fisheries; 
Lay System; Crew Shares; Labor Contracts; Incentive Systems 
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Introduction 
The choice of remuneration regime is a matter of great interest in fisheries.  There are 
two main types of remuneration regime in fisheries: flat wage and share contract.  In the 
flat wage regime, each crew is paid a fixed salary as compensation per pay period (e.g., a 
monthly salary).  In the share contract regime1, the crew receives a percentage of either 
the gross revenue or profit per fishing trip.  One of the most distinguishing features of 
remuneration in fisheries has been the norm of share contract regime.  Alternative 
remuneration regimes, such as fixed wage2, can only be found in a few fleets around the 
world.  Studies have theoretically shown that share contract regime is the optimal form of 
remuneration in fisheries (Sutinen, 1979; Plourde & Smith, 1989).  However, there has 
been no empirical study to support this theory. The fact that fixed wage is surfacing in 
some types of fisheries in recent years opens up a series of new research inquiries.  For 
example, one is prompted to ask questions like: Is the dominance of share remuneration 
coming to an end? Is the recent shift to fixed wage in some fisheries because of changes 
in some environmental parameters or is the use of share contract based on false beliefs all 
along? 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we do not distinguish the various levels of the share contracts.  In other 
words, as long as the crew receives a certain percentage of the revenue or profit, we 
consider that as “share contract” since details of the share contracts are unavailable in the 
case of Hawaii’s longline fisheries.  
2 The terms flat wage and fixed wage are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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 In this study, we apply the principal-agent framework to develop a model on 
choice of remuneration regimes in fisheries. We show that fixed wage may be a better 
alternative to share contract under certain conditions. We then use the Hawaii longline 
fisheries as a case study to shed some light on the empirical relationship between 
remuneration regime and economic returns in fisheries as well as to provide some 
explanations on the recent shift from share contract regime to flat rate regime in fisheries.   
 
 A Literature Review on the Determinants of Remuneration Regime in Fisheries 
Matthiasson (1997) has provided an excellent survey on remuneration practice in 
fisheries; his main conclusion is that share contract regime has been the dominant 
remuneration system. Other forms of remuneration, such as fixed wage, have also been 
applied in some fisheries though they have been short-lived (Matthiasson, 1997; Sutinen, 
1979).  Share contracts have also been the prevailing regime in the Hawaii longline 
fisheries until recent years.  Azabou, Bouzaiane and Nugent (1989) attribute this general 
predominance for the following reasons: 
i. Share contracts generate incentives for the crew to exert optimal fishing 
effort; 
ii. Share contracts share risk between the owner and the crew; 
iii. Share contracts use resources relatively better than fixed wage contracts, 
especially when taking into account the highly seasonal nature of fishery; 
iv. Share contracts encourage team work and cooperation, which improve fishing 
productivity; 
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v. Share contracts combine the comparative advantages of owner and crew for a 
sharing of benefits.  For instance, the owner may have better access to credit 
and to market opportunities, while the crew may be better fishermen. 
Platteau and Nugent (1992) summarize and compare the comparative vulnerabilities 
between fixed wage and share contract systems (See Table 1).  Clearly, the popularity of 
share contracts in fisheries can be attributed to the potential benefits from risk sharing 
and generating incentives.  
 
The roles of incentives 
Matthiasson (1997) has developed a theoretical model showing that pure share contract 
regime motivates crew to exert more effort than fixed wage or combination of fixed wage 
and share contract regime at every given wage level. This phenomenon can be attributed 
to incentives.  First, it is very difficult for the owner to supervise the fishing operation 
while the vessel is out at sea unless the vessel is owner-operated. Moreover, the cost of 
supervision would be very high, if it is at all possible.  The hired captain motivated by his 
share of the profit would ensure his crew fish hard. Second, a typical feature of fisheries 
is teamwork of which the amount of fish caught is determined by the effort of the entire 
crew; therefore, the marginal productivity of an individual fisherman can hardly be 
specified. Share contract gives the crew incentives to work for the common goal. 
 
Risk sharing 
In addition to incentive, risk behavior also plays a role in decision on remuneration in 
fishery. Platteau and Nugent (1992) point out that fishing is subject to three types of 
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simultaneous risk: production risk, price risk, and asset risk. Production risk results from 
uncertainties in both weather and marine ecology. Price risk is due to volatile supply 
conditions.  Asset risk arises from concern for loss of assets and human lives. Using share 
contracts can reduce the risk burden for both the vessel owner and crew. Thus, share 
contracts reveal the risk-averse behavior of the owner or crew. Due to technological 
changes, the role of labor relative to fishing productivity has become less important. 
Expectedly, the simplicity advantage of fixed wage may overcome the risk sharing effect 
of share contracts. Thus, fixed wage has become increasingly popular over time. 
While risk sharing is the most cited explanation for the popularity of share 
contracts in fisheries, McConnell and Price (2006) have pointed out that there remains a 
number of questions to explore.  First, for the share system to have emerged purely as a 
means of spreading risk, it must be the case that vessel owners are more risk-averse than 
fishermen. However, this method of risk diffusion might not be the only solution as 
owners may choose to diversify their investments through different species, in different 
locations and at different times.  Second, despite the uncertainties and risks associated 
with fishing, not all of the owners choose to use share contract regimes.  
 
Implications for modeling fishery remuneration choice 
Share contracts serve two functions:  (1) to diffuse risk and (2) to motivate crews to exert 
high levels of effort without direct owner supervision. Nevertheless, most theoretical 
models consider these two functions in isolation. Also, predictions from these two 
approaches are different. Sutinen (1979) assumes in his model that both the vessel owner 
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and crew are risk-averse, that all other means of risk transferring are too costly, and that 
the transaction costs are negligible.  Under these assumptions, a rational owner will 
choose some degree of share contract as risk is diffused among the crew, which reduces 
the cost of risk bearing and provides a work incentive that makes it less costly to generate 
a high desired level of performance from the crew.  On the other hand, if transaction costs 
are significant, and if there exists other risk shifting means; then the fixed wage may be 
optimal. 
Sutinen also shows that share contracts result in a higher level of employment and 
production.  The economic reasoning for this is that the risk-averse owner must earn an 
income sufficiently above what he would earn in alternative settings as compensation for 
bearing the risk. As expected, the owner chooses a risk sharing alternative that minimizes 
the risk premium.  In sharing risk, the owner would pay the crew members less than what 
it would cost him if he were able to bear that same risk himself.  Accordingly, under a 
share contract regime, the unit cost of production is lower and output is higher compared 
to a fixed wage system.  Plourde and Smith (1993) extend Sutinen’s model by integrating 
an output market, biological equilibrium, and regulatory policy into their framework.  
They have shown that in regulated markets, a fixed wage scheme may be optimal and 
leads to higher returns to fisheries firms.   
McConnell and Price (2006) (henceforth, MP (2006)) point out that incentive 
mechanisms are just as widely accepted as the risk sharing-based model.  Matthiasson 
(1999) develops a model for Icelandic fisheries where skippers are paid by share subject 
to an agreed minimum without sharing operating costs.  His key finding is that fixed 
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wage and share contracts may coexist as an incentive contract when strategy-dependent 
skipper-specific costs are important. With regard to incentive mechanisms, the most 
relevant modeling technique is the principal-agent approach by MP (2006).  In their 
model, there are two contracting agents: the vessel owner and crew.  The contract 
consists of two parameters specifying the share of ex-post revenues and costs for the 
crew.  The possibility that each crew member allocates his labor effort independently 
towards production is also considered.  In other words, given the assumption of a 
stochastic resource stock, there is a potential team agency situation.  Accordingly, 
remuneration systems based on incentive contracts offer an alternative rationale to the 
risk sharing contract. An interesting finding is that, for a given set of parameter values, 
remuneration system could include fixed wages independent of effort levels and revenue 
as well as no cost sharing.  Along the same line, Platteau & Nugent (1992) reviewed 
empirical studies and found that fixed wages are observed among vessels that have 
difficulty attracting qualified captains. Also, flat wages are applied to the crew whose 
efforts can easily be observed and less directly affect the catch level. 
 
 A Model of Remuneration Choice in Fishery 
Our model differs from the above mentioned models in the sense that it integrates both 
risk sharing and incentive into the analysis. The starting point of our theoretical model is 
the realization that effort level exerted by the crew is unverifiable due to uncontrollable 
factors (e.g., the fishing stock) in the production process.  Accordingly, the principal-
agent model (PA) is most appropriate in addressing the fisheries remuneration strategies. 
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To our knowledge the only paper that uses the PA approach is developed by MP (2006). 
According to principal-agent theory, as Acemoglu (1999) points out, contract is the 
mechanism designed to solve the trade-off between incentive and insurance. The latter is 
closely related to risk behavior of economic agents. Incentive and risk behavior are also 
crucial in fisheries. Accordingly, we focus on developing a model that puts a great 
emphasis on analyzing the integral relationship among incentive, effort, risk behavior as 
well as how this relationship leads to remuneration decision. Our model is more general 
than MP’s in two aspects. First, MP only considers the case of risk neutral crew. Here, we 
consider all cases of risk behavior for both crew and owner. Second, we extend MP’s 
model by treating effort level as a continuous rather than a binary variable.  
 
Model Setup 
Our model consists of two parts: a representative crew member and the vessel owner.  
The vessel owner is the principal who designs a contract with the crew.  It is noted that 
we consider a representative crew rather than the whole crew to make the model 
tractable. This is different from the assumption that the crew acts as if it was taking 
decisions collectively. Fitzroy and Kraft (1987) give an example of a model where 
difference between collective and individual decision making is illuminated in a similar 
setting. If the effort level is observable, the contract consists of two components: (1) the 
effort level and (2) the corresponding wage of the crew. More realistically, effort level is 
not observed and only the latter is the contract element. 
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The crew’s effort level is denoted by a continuous variable e and L He [e ,e ]∈ . Let π(e,ε) be 
the profit which is a function of effort level and other unobserved factors. More 
specifically, following Mas-Colell, Whinton, and Green [MWG] (1995) we assume that 
the owner’s profit relates to the crew’s effort via the conditional probability density 
function f(π|e). In other words, the owner’s expected profit can be written as: 
E( | e) f ( | e)dπ = π π π∫ . To make the model tractable, we consider the simple functional 
form: π(e) = e + ε, where ε represents all unobserved factors and is assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with mean of zero and variance of σ2: N(0, σ2). It follows that 
2E( | e) f ( | e)d e and Var( | e)π = π π π = π = σ∫ . Note that the owner is not able to perfectly 
derive effort level based on the realized profit due to random factor ε.  
As far as the crew’s wage is concerned, we assume that the owner offers a linear 
payment scheme in the form of w(π) = α + βπ, where β is the share ratio of profit for the 
crew. Notice that w = α as β=0; thus α can be considered a fixed wage level offered by 
the owner to the crew. In what followed, we first consider conventional assumption of 
risk behavior among owner and crew.  
 
Conventional risk assumptions: risk neutral owner and risk-averse crew   
First, like MP (2006) we assume the owner is risk neutral given that he has more resource 
than the crew, and therefore can diversify investment easier. His expected utility takes the 
form: ownerE(U ) E[( | e) w( )]= π − π . As for the crew, on the other hand, we follow 
conventional assumption that they are risk-averse. This assumption is considered 
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standard in the literature, for instance, see Sutinen (1979); Plourde & Smith (1989); 
Matthiasson (1999); McConnell & Price (2006). More specifically, we assume that the 
crew’s expected utility takes the following form: crewE(U ) E(w) var(w) v(e)= −ϕ − , 
where E(w) is the expected wage; φ is a parameter representing how much risk-averse the 
crew is; var(w) is variance in the wage level denoted by σ2; v(e) is the disutility function 
associated with the crew’s effort, such as fatigue experienced by the crew from strenuous 
fishing activities.  Following standard convention, v(e) is assumed to be strictly convex 
such that v’(e)>0 and v”(e)>0.  The first assumption implies that the value of discomfort 
increases as effort increases.  The second assumption implies that the value of discomfort 
increases at an increasing rate as effort increases. 
Substituting the wage equation, w(π) = α + βπ, into the crew’s expected utility 
expression, we have: 
crew
2
2
2 2
(1)
E(U ) E[ ( | e) var( | e) v(e)]
                = E( | e) var( | e) v(e)
                = E(e  ) var(e ) v(e)
                = e v(e)                                    
= α+β π −ϕ α+βπ −
α+β π −ϕ π −β
α+β + ε −ϕ +ε −β
α+β −ϕ −β σ                                                        
 
Given the above setup, the owner is assumed to face the following programming model: 
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owner
w(π)
owner
, ,e
E(U ) [( w( )]f ( | e)d E( | e) E(w( ))(2)             Max
                   
This is equivalent to:
                                   Max[E( | e) E(  + | e)] (3)             MaxE[U ]
α β
≡ π− π π π = π − π∫
≡ π − α βπ
crew
crew
                                    
s.t.
Individual rationality condition: EU U,   where Uis the reserved utility level of the crew.
Substituting EU from (1), we have the following equivalent nd
− −≥
2 2
ividual rationality condition: 
(4)            e v(e) U                                                                                                              
−α +β −ϕβ σ − ≥
 
2crew 2
Incentive compatibility condition:
(5)            e = argmax[E( )] argmax[ e v(e)]                                                                  U ≡ α+β −ϕ −β σ
 
The incentive compatibility condition means that given the contract (β*, α*) offered by 
the owner, the crew would best respond by exerting the effort level of e*.  The individual 
rationality (IR) expressed in equation (4) implies that the crew will accept the contract if 
and only if his utility gained from being employed by the owner is greater than his 
reserved utility.  If it is not, he will choose an alternative job or choose to work at his 
home country as in the case of a foreign crew member.  
 
Model solution 
The first order condition from (4) above gives β*=v’(e*). This result has a very nice 
economic interpretation, namely the marginal benefit of effort (β) is equal to its marginal 
cost (v’(e)). Also, given v’’(e)>0, there is a one to one positive relation between β and e. 
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The higher the effort level is, the higher the profit and vice versa. Note also that the 
owner can always make the individual rationality condition (4) binding. Thus, we have: 
2 2
2 2
(6)                   e v(e) U. 
Substituting, *=v'(e*) and solve for *  we have:
(7)                   *  = v(e*) + v '(e*) v '(e*)e*   U
−
−
α +β −ϕ − =β σ
β α
α ϕ σ − +
 
From the equation for α*, we see that the higher the reserved utility level is the 
higher the fixed portion of the crew’s wage. In the context of vessels with foreign crew in 
Hawaii’s longline fisheries, it is expected that α* is relatively small given that the foreign 
crew has a lower living standard at their home country. 
Next, substituting α*, β* into (1) and solve the owner’s expected utility 
maximization program with respect to e would yield the following.  
owner
ee
2 2
e
2 2
e
(8)
Max E[ | e E(  + )] Max E[U ]
                          Max[E( | e) E{v(e) v '(e) v '(e)e U} E( | e)]
                          Max[e - v(e) - v '(e) v '(e)e U v '(e)e]
                 
−
−
π − α βπ≡
≡ π − +ϕσ − + −β π
≡ ϕσ + − −
2 2
2
         [e - v(e) - v '(e) v '(e)e U]Max
e
By the FOC with respect to e, we then have:
(9)               1 - v'(e*) -2 v '(e*)v"(e*) 0
−≡ ϕσ + −
ϕσ =
 
2
Substituting β* = v'(e*) and solving for β* , we have:
                                                                                    1(10)            *  
1 2 v"(e*)
β = + ϕσ
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Equation (10) is the key finding of our theoretical model. From (10), we can see that 
(0,1]*   β ∈  which is expected since β  is the proportion of profit given to the crew. 
Also, the larger the variance in the profit level, σ2, the smaller the share of profit will be 
given to the crew. This result is very relevant to fishery where the profit level by trip 
fluctuates a great deal due to a host of uncontrollable factors. In extreme cases, variation 
in the profit can be so big that the profit level π = e + ε is largely determined by the 
unobserved factor ε. Accordingly, the owner finds it hard to tell which portion of the 
profit is determined by effort level. As a result, he would prefer the fixed wage system 
(choosing β=0). The risk parameter, φ, also plays an important role. The more risk-
averse the crew, the lower will be his share of the profit. This finding is consistent with 
MP’s (2006). In the context of Hawaii, an increasing number of crew is being hired from 
foreign countries. These fishermen consider fishing as the only source of income used to 
support them and remit to their home country. Therefore, they are very much averse to 
risk. This factor, in addition to large variation in profit, makes β even smaller. At some 
point, we can observe β=0 as the case of a fixed wage system.    
It is also of great interest to look at the relationship between effort level and risk 
aversion. Eriksson, Teyssier, Villeval (2006) in their economic experiment on principal-
agent model find out that more risk-averse participants exert less effort.  From the FOC: 
21 - v'(e*) -2 v '(e*)v"(e*) 0ϕσ =  and applying the implicit function theorem we have:  
2
2 2
 de* 2 v '(e*)v"(e*)(11)             - 
d v"(e*) + 2 [v"(e*) v '(e*)v '''(e*)]
σ=ϕ ϕσ +  
14 
 
Thus, the sign of the relationship between effort and risk aversion depends on the 
sign of the third derivative of the effort disutility function v”’(e). As for v”’(e) > 0, e.g., 
the marginal disutility function of effort is convex, we observe a negative relationship 
between effort level and risk aversion. It could be that being risk-averse the agent is 
afraid that the cost of exerting more effort is greater than his increased share of the profit 
which depends on other uncontrollable factors.     
 
General case of risk behavior for the owner and crew 
We now consider the most general case of risk behavior for the owner and the crew.  In 
this case, not only the crew but the owner also considers both his net income (π-w (π)) 
and variation in that income. Accordingly, his expected utility can be written as: 
owner(12)           U (e) w( ) - var[ (e) w( )]
where  is the owner's level of risk aversion. Note that:
2 2var[ (e) w ( )]= var[(1- )( (e)) ]  var[(1- )(e - ) ] = (1- )
Thus, we have:
(13)          
= π − π γ π − π
γ
π − π β π − α = β ε − α β σ
owner 2 2 U (e) w( ) - (1- )                                                                            = π − π γ β σ
 
The individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions are the same as those for 
the case of risk neutral owner. Following similar analysis, we can show that the owner 
faces the following programming model: 
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2 2 2
e
2
(14)
ow nerM ax E [U ] M axE[e v (e) { v'(e) + (1-v'(e)) }] 
B y  the  FO C  w ith  respect to  e, w e have:
(15)           1  - v '(e*) - 2 [ v '(e*)v "(e*) (1 v '(e*)v "(e*)] 0
S ubstitu ting  v '(e*)= *  and  rearrange w e ha
≡ − − σ ϕ γ
σ ϕ − γ − =
β
2 2 2
2
2 2
ve:
(16)           1  +  2 v "(e*)  =  * [1 +  2 v "(e*) 2 v "(e*)]
T hus,  
1  +  2 v "(e*)(17 )            *  =                                                      
1 +  2 v "(e*) 2 v "(e*)
γσ β ϕσ + γσ
γσβ ϕσ + γσ
 
From (17), we have: 
(18)           
2
2 2 2
 2 v"(e*) = 0
[1 + 2 v"(e) 2 v"(e*)]
∂β γσ >∂γ ϕσ + γσ .  
In other words, the more risk-averse the owner is, the more willing he would be to 
increase the share of profit to the crew. The case in which the crew is risk neutral i.e., φ = 
0 is also interesting. Here, we have β* = 1. Thus, the owner’s income is π−α −βπ = −α ; 
accordingly  α <0. This will be equivalent to the situation where the owner leases the boat 
to the crew who pays the owner a fixed rent of α to use the boat.  Table 2 summarizes the 
optimal crew shares for all possible combinations of risk behaviors of the crew and 
owner.  
For the case of risk neutral crew, the main concern is the profit level. The owner 
optimal strategy is to lease the vessel to the crew and receive a fixed rent (MWG, 1995). 
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As for risk-averse owner, he is willing to pay a higher portion of the realized profit to the 
crew in exchange for risk sharing. Accordingly, the share of the profit for the crew is 
higher under the case of risk-averse owner than that of risk neutral owner. Also, given 
v’(e*) = β*, the more risk-averse the owner is, the higher β* and the higher the optimal 
effort level e*.  
As far as the fixed portion of the crew’s wage level α is concerned, from 
2 2*=v(e*) + v '(e*) v '(e*)e*   U
−α ϕ σ − + , we have,  
(19)         d * v"(e*)[2 v '(e*) e*]
de*
α = ϕ −  
 The interrelationship of α* with β* and e* are thus less tractable unless we 
further assume some specific functional from of v(e). 
 
 
Empirical Model, Findings and Discussions 
 
Before proceeding to the empirical exercise, we can infer ceteris paribus from the profit 
function: π(e) = e + ε  that the higher the effort level, the higher the profit level. However, 
the crew’s effort is unobservable.  Instead, we look at the relationship between the crew’s 
share and profit level. One finding from the theoretical model is that there is an one-to-
one positive relation between β* and e*:  β* = v’(e*). Accordingly, e* = g(β*) where g() 
is an inverse function of v’(). Substitute e*=g(β*) into the profit  function π(e) = e + ε, we 
have  π(β*) = g(β*) + ε. This implies at the equilibrium dπ(β)/dβ = g’(β*) = 1/v”(β*) 
which is greater than zero by assumption.  
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An Empirical Model 
This section aims at empirically checking the theoretical prediction of the positive 
correlation between crew’s share and the vessel’s profit. We also investigate the related 
question if a share contract system generates higher economic returns than flat wage 
regime.  In theory, the share parameter β is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.  
According to the theoretical model, a higher β corresponds to higher economic returns.  
Due to unavailable detailed information regarding the crew’s share in ex-post revenue, 
we consider two cases: the pure fixed wage (i.e. β=0) and the share contract (i.e. 0<β<1) 
systems. 
As far as the profit variable is concerned, since profit information is not available 
in our data, we use revenue as a proxy. Also, taking into account the multiple output 
feature of the longline fisheries, average trip revenue is used as the performance measure 
(the dependent variable) in this study. Average trip revenue is calculated by dividing the 
vessel’s annual revenue into the number of fishing trips the vessel operated in 20043.  
Fishing revenue is postulated to be affected by several factors (explanatory variables) that 
are known to have potential impacts on fishing revenue.  One such variable is the 
remuneration method implemented.  
To estimate the impact of share contracts on fishing revenue, one may consider 
using the following model: 
                                                 
3 We realize that the average profit per trip would provide more informative measure of crew work effort 
intensity than the average revenue per trip. Unfortunately, we don’t have information on profit. Thus, the 
use of revenue as a proxy for profit in our case is certainly less than desirable. However, we believe the use 
of revenue as a proxy can nevertheless shed some light on crew effort on economic returns in general.   
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(20)         Y X I= β+ δ + ε  
where Y is the fishing revenue; X is a vector of explanatory variables; and I is a binary 
variable indicating whether the vessel employs share contracts or flat wages (I=1 if the 
vessel uses share contracts, and I =0 if the vessel uses flat wages).  However, this model 
may result in inconsistent estimates from the effect of share contracts on fishing revenue 
because employing share contracts may generate interaction effects with observed or 
unobserved vessel characteristics (Maddala, 1983; Kim et al., 1998).  For instance, the 
level of technology of a vessel influences the vessel remuneration methods; yet similarly, 
the level of technology is correlated to revenue.  If the decision to use share contracts is 
based on individual selection, there may exist selection biases4 in that share contract 
vessels may have systematically different characteristics from flat wage vessels (Kim et 
al., 1998).  Vessel characteristics may also have different impacts on revenue depending 
on the type of remuneration. The impact, for example, from hooks per set on revenue for 
vessels using share contracts may differ from vessels using flat wages. 
To correct these problems, we invoke the switching regression model (Maddala, 
1983), which simultaneously estimates the selection equation and two revenue regression 
                                                 
4 In theory, the self-selectivity of remuneration regime may exist for both owners and crews. On the one 
hand, the owner offers compensation conditional on owner’s attributes and expected revenues. On the other 
hand, the crew determines whether to accept the offer conditional on crew’s attributes and expected 
revenues. In the context of Hawaii longline fishery, majority of crews are foreigners whose main objective 
is to be employed by a vessel onwer, regardless of remuneration practice, to have salary and send it back to 
family at home. Accordingly, we can assume that the remuneration choice endogeneity refers to owner’s 
behavior only.  
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equations for share contract and fixed wage vessels.  The empirical model follows closely 
the formulation of Lokshin and Sajaia (2005). To consider a model that describes 
choosing remuneration systems with two regression equations, we define a criterion 
function I determining whether the vessel employs share contracts or not: 
i i i
i i i
(21)
I 1   if    'Z u 0          
I 0  if    'Z u 0           
= γ + >
= γ + <
                      
where Ii = 1 if vessel i uses share contracts, and Ii = 0 if vessel i uses fixed wages. Zi is a 
vector of variables that influences vessels’ contractual choice; Zi includes vessel’s current 
appraised value, the number of hooks used per fishing set, and a binary variable 
indicating the ease with which the vessel can find local crew. It is expected that the 
higher the vessel’s current appraised value and the higher the number of hooks per set, 
the less the vessel’s revenue depends on the crew, the more likely the vessel’s owner will 
apply fixed wage. Also, given that local crew may be less risk-averse than foreign crew, 
the easier it is for the owner to find local crew, the more likely he will apply share 
contract.  
The revenue regression equations for share contract and flat wage vessels then can 
be defined as: 
'
1
'
2
1 i i 1 i i  
2 i i 2 i i  
( 2 2 )            y X             i f    I =  1                                                           
( 2 3 )            y X            i f    I =  0                                         
= β + ε
= β + ε              
 
where y1i and y2i are the average trip revenue for share contract and flat wage vessels 
respectively.  Xi is a vector of explanatory variables thought to affect vessel revenue, 
including the current appraised vessel value and the number of hooks used per fishing 
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set5. These two variables represent the technological status of the vessel, thus, are 
expected to have positive impact on the vessel revenue.  
Assume also that ui, ε1i, and ε2i follow a trivariate normal distribution with zero 
means and the covariance matrix: 
2
u1 u2u
2
u1 1
2
u2 2
σ σ σ
σ
σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Ω = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
σ  
 where 2uσ , 21σ , 22σ  are  variance of the error terms in the selection equation (21),  the 
share contract equation (22), and flat wage equation (23) respectively; σ21 and σ31 are the 
covariance between the error term in the selection equation (21) with the error terms in 
equation (22) and equation (23) respectively. 
Given these assumptions of the error terms, the logarithmic likelihood function for 
equations (22) and (23) can be expressed as: 
 
i 1i 1i 1 1 i 2i 2i 2 2
i 1
(24)         ln L {I[ln(F( ) ln(f ( / ) / ) (1 I )[ln(1 F( )) ln(f ( / ) / )]}     
=
= η + ε σ σ + − − η + ε σ σ∑
   
F() and f() are the cumulative distribution and the distribution function respectively. ηji is 
defined as follows: 
                                                 
5 In the revenue regression, we include capital and labor as inputs. We notice that, besides these variables, 
fish stock and captains’ experience are important determinants. As for fish stock, we don’t have 
information in the data. We have also included the captain’s experience in our model estimations; however, 
the findings were not significantly different from those reported in this paper.  Therefore, we use the 
current model because it is simpler but give the same results.  
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i j ji j
ji
2
j
( Z / )(25)                   j=1,2
1
γ + ρ ε ση = −ρ  
where ρ1, ρ2 are the correlation coefficient of u with ε1 and ε2 respectively.  
 
We are particularly interested in the potential revenue gain/loss in the event a vessel uses 
an alternative method of remuneration.  We expect that the empirical results should yield 
the differences in vessel revenue when share contract vessels switch to a flat wage system 
instead, and vice versa.  To verify our expectation, the following conditional expectations 
are constructed: 
 
The conditional expectation of revenue of a vessel using share contract is: 
1i i 1i 1i 1 1 1 i i(26)           E(y | I 1, x ) x f ( Z ) / F( Z )                                                                = = β +σ ρ γ γ
 
 
The conditional expectation of revenue of a share contract vessel if it applied flat wage is: 
2 2 i
0i i 1i 1i 2
i
f ( Z )(27)           E(y | I 1, x ) x                                                                   
F( Z )
+
σ ρ γ= = β γ
 
The expected potential gain/loss of a share contract vessel if it applied flat wage will be:                    
0 i i 1i 1i i 1i(28)            E ( y | I 1, x )  - E ( y | I 1, x )                                                         = =
 
Similarly, the conditionally expected revenue of a flat wage vessel if it applied share 
contract is: 
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1 1 i
1i i 2i 2i 1
i
f ( Z )(29)           E(y | I 0, x ) x                                                                
1 F( Z )
−
σ ρ γ= = β − γ
 
The conditional expectation of revenue of a vessel using flat wage is: 
2 2 i
0 i i 2 i 2 i 2
i
f ( Z )(30)           E (y | I 0, x ) x                                                           
1 F( Z )
−
σ ρ γ= = β − γ
 
The expected potential gain/loss of a flat wage vessel by applying share contract instead 
will be:         
1i i 2 i 0 i i 2 i(31)            E (y | I 0, x ) E (y | I 0, x )                                                                  = − =
 
Data  
Data collected and used for this study from the 2004 Hawaii-based Longline Technology 
Survey (HLTS) provides baseline fishing technology and some economic information on 
the Hawaii-based domestic longline fleet. The unit of survey is an individual longline 
vessel. There are 86 surveyed vessels. Traditionally, the Hawaii longline fisheries include 
both tuna and swordfish.  However, the HLTS focused only on the tuna fishery, due to 
the swordfish fishery closure in March 2004.  The survey questionnaire included two 
main sections.  The first section provided key information on the number of crew, 
remuneration method, and fishing experience of the captain. The second section focused 
on the technology onboard the vessel: a list of all electronic equipment (e.g., satellite 
communication, computers, etc.), dates of when each piece of technological equipment 
was adopted, and the purchase price of each piece of equipment. The appraised current 
vessel value was used as proxy for the overall technological status of the vessel. It is 
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noted that the appraised value might not be a good indicator of technology because it 
accounts for depreciation. For instance, if there are two vessels with exactly the same 
equipments but with different vessel age, their appraised values may differ but their 
technology are the same. We realized this fact and run econometric models controlling 
for the vessel’s age; however, the findings were not significantly different from those 
reported in this paper.   
Because the HLTS did not survey vessel revenue information, two other sources 
of data were employed in this study. The first data set, from the Hawaii Division of 
Aquatic Resources (HDAR), provided detailed information in 2004 on vessel’s catch, by 
species, with its corresponding auction price. Based on this information the vessel’s 
annual revenue was estimated as well as the total number of fishing trips taken during 
that year.  The second data set from logbook data, provided by the National Marine 
Fisheries Services, contained detailed information on the quantity of fish (by species) 
landed and kept per vessel.  These three datasets were linked using vessel names and 
permit numbers. We use the combined data for the empirical exercise.  
Table 3 presents three key relationships between vessel characteristics and 
remuneration regime found in the combined data.  First, if the vessel crew size is larger 
than 5, there is a high probability of vessels to use a fixed wage regime.  However, 
vessels using hired captains rather than having owner operators have a higher probability 
of using a share contract regime.  Third, if it is easy to find the crew, there is high 
probability that vessels will employ share contract. 
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Model Specification 
There are two important variables used in the analysis: remuneration choice and average 
revenue per trip. The remuneration choice (binary) variable is 1 if there is at least one 
crew hired by share contract in addition to the captain, and 0 if otherwise.6  These two 
variables form the foundation for the estimation procedures.  Appendix 1 briefly defines 
all the variables used in the empirical model. 
As part of the switching regression procedure, a probit model is used to 
investigate the determinants of employing share contracts in the Hawaii longline 
fisheries.  There are two sets of independent variables. The first set includes all 
explanatory variables in the revenue regression equations.  Such inclusion takes into 
account the fact that fishing revenue also has an impact on the owner’s decision to use 
share contracts.  Owners will be more likely to employ share contracts if it results in 
higher revenue than flat wage.  Hence, factors that have an impact on revenue may also 
have correspondingly similar impacts on the remuneration choice. Also, as pointed out by 
Wooldridge (2004:562), “inclusion of the second stage’s variables in the first stage is not 
very costly while incorrect exclusion may lead to inconsistent estimations.”  The second 
                                                 
6 In reality, remuneration system used among Hawaii longline fishing boats is a bit more 
complex than what we are assuming here.  Some vessels had split crews such as a 
Vietnamese captain, first mate and cook (who all fished too) and a crew of foreign 
workers (e.g. Filipinos, Micronesians, etc). The captain, first mate, and cook were paid on 
share contract and the foreign crew by fixed wage.  
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set of the independent variables in the share contract equation aims at satisfying the 
identification condition.  Non-linearity is not sufficient to meet the identification 
condition; rather, additional identifying variables are added in the first equation.  These 
variables are not included in the revenue equations.  Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) 
suggests that using weak instruments are problematic since the potential bias does not 
disappear even in a large sample. Given the small sample size of our data, it is even more 
crucial to choose good instruments. We also follow Wooldridge (2004:104) by not using 
any interaction term to limit the number of over-identifying restrictions.  In particular, we 
include three instrumental variables. The first one is a binary variable representing the 
ease with which owners find crew. The second instrument is the ethnicity of the vessel 
owner. The third instrument is a binary variable indicating whether the captain is also the 
vessel owner. These variables do not significantly impact vessel revenue but rather have a 
significant impact on the owner’s decision to use share contracts.  
In addition to share contracts, other potential determinants of fishing revenue 
were integrated into the model.  We make use of the vessel’s appraised current value as a 
proxy for the overall technological status of the vessel. Number of fishing hooks used per 
set was used as a proxy to measure the utilization of a vessel’s potential fishing capacity.  
The more hooks used per set, the more a vessel could utilize its fishing capacity potential.  
Number of crew served as a proxy for vessel’s human resources.  The size of the crew is 
expected to have a positive correlation with the vessel revenue. 
Table 4 shows comparison of descriptive statistics between share contract and 
fixed wage vessels. As can be seen from Table 4, fixed wage vessels outperform share 
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contract vessels in terms of revenue.  It is also noted that share contract vessels have 
higher  appraised current value whereas flat wage vessels utilize more hooks per set. This 
contrast highlights different strategies to improve total revenue. Share contracts vessels 
focus on technological investments, whereas flat wage vessels emphasize increasing the 
number of hooks used per set.  These differences are, however, insignificant.  The 
significant difference that we are most interested in is the ease in finding local crew. As 
expected, it is much easier for share contract vessels to find local crew than it is for fixed 
wage vessels. 
 
Main Empirical Results 
Table 5 presents the determinants of share contract. The key factor in determining 
remuneration regimes is the ease of finding a local crew.  The easier it is for the owner to 
find a local crew, the more likely he prefers using share contracts. This finding reflects 
present circumstances within the Hawaii longline fisheries. As owners experience a 
shortage in the supply of local fishermen, owners must depend on a third party to find 
foreign crew.  As implied by the theoretical model, it might be in the owner’s interest to 
use fixed wages given high level of risk aversion among foreign crew. 
There are also two other variables that show significant impacts on using share 
contracts.  Owner operated vessels are more likely to use flat wages because the owners 
can supervise their crew during the fishing trip. Vessels with larger crews also prefer flat 
wages to share contracts possibly because of the trade-off between the quality and 
quantity of the crew.  It is likely that vessel owners of large crew do not place much 
27 
 
emphasis on the marginal productivity of each crew member which is hard to identify.  
Meanwhile, owners with small number of crew may believe in the quality of crew and 
thus use share contract as a mechanism to increase marginal productivity of each crew.  
The effect of vessel’s characteristics on its fishing revenue is different among 
share contract and flat wage vessels (Table 6).  The technological status of the vessel has 
a significant impact on fishing revenue among flat wage vessels, though this is 
insignificant for share contract vessels.  Thus, technological investment may help 
improve productivity of flat wage vessels while this may have little impact on vessels 
using share contracts.  Notice in Table 4 that fixed wage vessels have smaller current 
vessel values; therefore, a lower return on technology of share contract vessels can be 
attributed to diminishing return on investment.  The effect of the number of hooks used 
per set on fishing revenue is consistently significant in these two groups of vessels: both 
remuneration strategies produce higher economic returns when there are more hooks per 
set.  Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for the share contract equation is greater than 
that for the flat wage equation, which implies that share contract vessels may make more 
efficient use of hooks than flat wage vessels. As far as the effect of the crew size on 
revenue is concerned, the more crew members there are, higher revenue is realized. 
However, this effect is significant only among the share contract vessels. This result is 
consistent with what we discussed above regarding the trade-off between quality and 
quantity of crew. It is likely that share contract vessels place more emphasis on the 
quality of crew; therefore, an increase in the number of crew among share contract 
vessels leads to more significant improvement in revenue than among flat wage vessels.    
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The estimated correlation coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 between the error term in the 
selection equation and the error terms in the share contract and flat wage regression 
equations reveal any selection bias in the share contract decision. ρ1 is statistically 
significant; but ρ2, though it is negative, is insignificant. Given both ρ1 and ρ2 are 
negative, one can infer that the flat wage vessels may have an “absolute advantage.”  
That is, flat wage vessels would have above average performance whether they chose to 
use share contract or not.  In this case, share contract vessels have below average 
performance whether they chose to use share contract or not. In other words, the flat 
wage vessels are generally better fishers.  
Having estimated the parameters of the switching regression models, we can 
calculate the expected gains and losses from counterfactual revenue differences [equation 
28 and 31].  These results will show whether it is economically beneficial for the share 
contract vessels to employ flat wages and conversely whether it is better for the flat wage 
vessels to employ share contracts.  
Table 7 presents the differences between the expected revenue of the 
counterfactual and expected revenue of the actual. The counterfactual is defined as the 
expected revenue a share contract (flat wage) vessel would have generated if it had used 
flat wages (share contracts).  A key finding is that flat wage vessels would markedly 
increase their revenue margins if they had applied share contracts. This finding has 
significant implications for the Hawaii longline fisheries as recently more share contract 
vessels have changed to using flat wages. One of the reasons for this change is that 
foreign crew have recently been the main source of fishermen in Hawaii. Foreign crew 
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may be more risk-averse than local crew because of their dependence on fishing as the 
only source of income. As implied by the theoretical model, it is optimal for the owner to 
use flat wage the case of very risk-averse crew. However, not all foreign crew are very 
risk-averse, some of them may even be risk neutral or risk preferred. It might be more 
beneficial for the owner to use share contract under such circumstances. Put it differently, 
a more flexible remuneration system may be better than a pure fixed wage regime. This 
finding is consistent with that by Eriksson, Teyssier, Villeval (2006) who show that 
workers would exert more effort if they had the flexibility of choosing the remuneration 
practice in accordance with their risk preference.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper attempts to systematically answer the question: “why share contract regime is 
the optimal form of remuneration in the fisheries sector?” By focusing on the Hawaii 
longline fisheries, where flat wage has recently become the preferred mode of 
remuneration, we have a strong case to test this theoretical prediction. Using the 
principal-agent approach, we develop a simple and comprehensive model that take into 
account the role of both incentive and risk behavior to explain the underlying mechanism 
of remuneration choice in fisheries. Our model suggests that there is a trade-off between 
incentive and risk aversion. The more risk-averse the crew is, less incentive will be 
brought about by the contract. Accordingly, it might be optimal for the owner to use fixed 
wage under certain circumstance. As in the case of Hawaii’s longline fisheries, one of the 
primary reasons for the substitution of share contract for fixed wage has been the lack of 
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local crew members keeping longlining as their primary occupation.  As a result, the 
vessel owner is relegated to hire foreign crew who are more risk-averse than local crew.  
The high level of risk aversion among foreign crews is probably one of the reasons for 
the recent observed move to fixed wage in remuneration practice.  
Empirically, this is one of the first studies investigating the impact of share 
contracts on fishing productivity.  The counterfactual simulations indicated that vessels 
employing flat wages would produce higher fishing revenues if they adapt a more 
flexible remuneration system that best fit the crew’s risk behavior rather than a pure fixed 
wage regime. More specifically, it may be better for the Hawaii longline fleet if foreign 
crew has the possibility of choosing remuneration scheme that fits their risk behavior 
rather than letting remuneration to be solely determined by the owner.  
 Our model shows that risk behavior of the crew and owner plays an important 
role in deciding how large the optimal revenue sharing parameter β should be. The paper 
could have more profound findings if we had data on the risk preference. A promising 
extension of the study is to conduct an experiment on risk preferences among crew and 
owners in Hawaii’s longline fishery. We then can combine experimental data with data 
used here.   
 There are several limitations of this study. First, the theoretical model 
investigates the relationship between risk aversion of the owner and crew and choice of 
remuneration. However, the current dataset does not contain measures of “risk aversion” 
for either party. Conducting a field experiment on risk preferences of Hawaii longline 
fishermen would be a worthwhile extension. Second, we do not have the data for specific 
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values of the share parameter β; thus, instead of treating β as a continuous variable, we 
simply treat it as a binary variable.  The theoretical model predicts that the greater 
percentage of the crew share, the higher the vessel revenue will be.  It will be interesting 
to see how a change in the shared revenue portions impact revenue margins.   
There are also a number of interesting facets of remuneration in Hawaii longline 
fisheries that can be grounds for future investigation.  First, foreign crew and local crew 
may consist of different labor qualities.  These differences in quality may have an impact 
on an owner’s decision regarding remuneration strategies.  An owner, for example, may 
be more inclined to use share contracts with high quality labor.  Further studies of the 
determinants that influence labor quality can be a fruitful area for future research.   
Second, the Hawaii longline fisheries consist of three ethnicities of vessel owners, which 
imply different decision making behaviors. Asian owners, for example, might prefer 
share contracts that promote cooperation. Investigating the effect of ethnicity on 
remuneration choice is a matter of great relevance.  Lastly, owners with a fleet of vessels 
may prefer to apply the same kind of remuneration on all of his boats. Given that it is not 
uncommon for an owner to possess multiple boats in the Hawaii longline fisheries, 
another potential extension of the paper would explore how this feature influences the use 
of a particular remuneration strategy. 
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Table 1. Comparative Vulnerability of Different Remuneration Systems  
Type of  Vulnerability Fixed Wage Share Contract 
Labor Shirking 
Asset management 
Output Underreporting 
Input Over-reporting 
Quality Shirking 
Production Risk 
Price Risk 
Serious 
Serious 
Serious 
Serious 
Slight 
Borne by Owner 
Borne by owner 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Slight 
Shared 
Shared 
Source: Adapted from Platteau and Nugent (1992) 
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Table 2: Optimal Values of β under Different Risk Behavior Scenarios 
 Risk-averse owner Risk neutral owner 
Risk-averse crew 0<β*oc<1 0<β*oc <β*c<1 
Risk neutral crew  β*= 1 β* =1 
 
Note: β*oc corresponds to the case in which both crew and owner are risk-averse. 
          *c corresponds to the case in which only crew is risk-averse. 
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Table 3.  Main Vessel Characteristics by Remuneration Regime  
Vessel Characteristics Share Contract 
(%) 
Flat Wage 
(%) 
Number of crew 
Equal to 5 
Less than 5 
Greater than 5 
 
47.9 
87.5 
45.4 
 
52.1 
12.5 
54.6 
Owner operator 
Yes 
No 
 
48.7 
59.2 
 
51.3 
40.8 
Difficulty in finding a crew 
Very difficult 
Not much 
 
45.4 
74.0 
 
54.6 
26.0 
Number of Vessels 
 
55 
 
45 
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Table 4.  Mean Comparisons by Main Characteristics of Vessels 
 Total 
sample 
(1) 
Share 
contract 
(2) 
Flat wage 
 
  (3) 
p-values(+) 
 
(2)-(3) 
Vessel’s trip revenue ($) 
Vessel’s appraised current value ($) 
Ethnicity 
Time  working together (years) 
Hooks per set 
Easy to find local crew (Easy=1) 
Number of crew 
31,295 
428,116 
1.8 
0.5 
1945 
0.36 
5.12 
30,714 
456,316 
1.7 
0.5 
1924 
0.47 
4.9 
31,920 
393,548 
1.9 
0.5 
1968 
0.23 
5.3 
0.73 
0.13 
 
0.46 
0.72 
0.01*** 
0.005*** 
  
(+) Based on a one-tailed t-test 
** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 1.5:  Determinants of Share Contract  
  Variable Coefficient t value p>|t| 
Vessel’s Current Value ($) 
Hooks per fishing set (number) 
Easy to Find Crew (1=yes; 0=no) 
Owner’s ethnicity  
(1=Caucasian, 2=Korean, 
3=Vietnamese) 
Owner operated (1=yes; 0=no) 
Number of crew 
Number of estimated observation  
0.0007
-0.0004
0.64
0.17
-0.72
-0.81
64
     0.71 
     -0.56 
2.68*** 
        0.54 
 
-1.97** 
-2.40*** 
0.47
0.58
0.00
0.59
0.05
0.01
Note: ** indicates significance at 5% level;  *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 6.  Parameter Estimates of the Revenue Equations 
  
Variable          Share Contract 
  Coefficient               p>|t|
       Flat Wage 
Coefficient          p>|t|
 
Vessel’s Current Value 
Hooks per fishing set 
Number of Crew 
Number of observation = 64 
ρ1 
ρ2 
2.49
14.07
4729
   -0.64** 
        -0.17 
0.42
0.00
0.03
 
19.08*** 
8.33*** 
578 
0.00
0.01
0.69
0.03
0.77
Note: ** indicates significance at 5% level; ** indicates significance at 1% level.  
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Table 7. Counterfactual versus Expected Revenue 
Revenue Difference between 
counterfactual and expected 
actual revenue 
                  p-value 
Share contract vessels 
Flat wage vessels 
734 
7314*** 
                     0.28 
                     0.00 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
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APPENDIX 1 
A Brief Definition of Variables in the Empirical Model 
Variable Definition 
Share contract 
 
 
Vessel revenue 
 
Vessel current appraised value 
 
Ethnicity 
 
 
 
Time crew working together 
 
Hooks per set 
 
Ease to find crew members 
A binary variable whose value is 1 if the vessel 
applies share contracts and 0 if it applies flat wages 
 
The average revenue of vessel per trip 
 
The estimated value of the vessel  
 
Ethnic traits of vessel owner 
1 represents Caucasian, 2 represents Korean 
American, and 3 represents Vietnamese American  
 
Years which the same crew spent working together 
 
The average number of hooks used per fishing set. 
 
How easy is it to find a local fisherman? 
1. Easy 
0. Otherwise 
 
